The tired old civilisational categories of 'East' and 'West', loosely identified with 'Islam' and 'modernity', are alive and well, nowhere more so than in contemporary Turkey. The Justice Development Party (AKP) currently in government employs them assiduously to political advantage but they have a long history, having defined the parameters of societal identity and political discourse throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. The paper takes the strength of the categories as its starting point but moves beyond them by asking if discourses, narratives and identities, individual and collective, exist in Turkey which question, overcome and ultimately undermine the categories of 'East' and 'West'. The paper starts by investigating the evolution of ideas about East and West since the late Ottoman period and accepts that they are still dominant. However, since the 1980s in particular, they are being undermined in a de facto way by cultural developments in literature and music, new trends in historiography and novel ways of relating to the past. In some ways in contemporary Turkey, the paper concludes, culture trumps the inherently essentialist idea of 'civilisation' and Turkish society is ahead of its political and intellectual elites.
Introduction
The tired old categories of 'East' and 'West' have powerful purchase in contemporary global affairs. Islamist terrorists and their obliging opponents raise the spectre of a perennial and immutable conflict between them. A civilisational discourse, with its inescapably essentialist characteristics -even when the talk is of civilisational 'dialogue' instead of a 'clash' -has gained ground over the past two decades. It is underpinned by a resurgence of religion and identity politics which has partly replaced or -more accurately -has been superimposed on the political conflict between right and left in many parts of the world.
Nowhere do the categories of 'East' and 'West' appear more alive and well than in 2 The paper investigates the extent to which these binaries still hold water.
In its first part, the paper outlines the emergence of the ideas of 'East' and 'West' within the broader discourse on 'civilisation' since the late Ottoman era. It then traces the changing meanings of the terms through the decades leading up to the present time and argues that they have great bearing in both intellectual debates about civilisation and in political discourse. In its second part, which deals with Turkey mostly from the 1980s onwards, the paper focuses on literature, music and in historiography and shows that, in aspects of culture at least, and in how at least some historians and intellectuals navigate the past, the idea of 'civilisation' -which is inherently essentialist -loses its relevance.
Two caveats are in order, pertaining to the paper's object of enquiry and its purpose. This is an exploration of ideas and discourses in themselves, abstracted from their origins or contexts.
The many socio-economic and political transformations which Turkish society and politics have undergone in recent decades, 3 and which are inextricably linked with -and to some degree explain -the emergence of these ideas, are not part of the paper's remit. Nor are the theoretical implications of the argument for the debate on Islam and modernity. 4 I have engaged more extensively elsewhere with some of the theoretical debates which underpin the questions I address here but this paper carries out an empirical investigation.
The shifting meanings of the key concepts which constitute my focus, particularly 'East' and 'West', are traced through the discussion but I have not carried out a wider analysis of their history or significance beyond Turkey. 5 For the purposes of this paper, I define 'universalism' quite narrowly, as overcoming of the idea that East and West are immutable entities and conceiving of a world where these categories are alien and irrelevant.
The categories of 'East' and 'West' in Republican Turkey
'East versus West' defines the history of Republican Turkey. This is a simplistic statement but it is, at one level, a true one. The late Ottoman Empire witnessed -similarly to Europe -the emergence and spread of civilisation as a universal concept. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, 'civilisation' also came to refer to particular civilisations as collective identities. This was a quintessentially modern idea -even though it projected civilisations back onto the depths of history -because it rested on the notion that civilisations had identifiable 'characteristics' which could be observed by the human subject. The group of intellectuals who later came to be called 'Young Ottomans' introduced the idea of the 'Muslim world' although for them Islam could be reconciled with a universal civilisation and the principles of freedom and constitutionalism. During Abdülhamid's period, the categories of 'East' and 'West' spread and hardened, driven by the sultan's own political Islamist designs. 6 Recent scholarship has criticised the tendency in Turkish historiography to read history backwards and retrospectively project onto the late Ottoman period latter day categories, specifically those of secularism versus Islam. 7 The criticism has been applied particularly to studies of Ziya Gökalp. 8 However that may be -and even though Gökalp's perspective was a universalist one in that he saw no contradiction between universal civilisation (medeniyet) and Turkish culture (hars) -the categories of 'East' and 'West' can already be discerned in his thought and were juxtaposed to one another as clearly distinct entities. 9 They became rigid in Young Turk thought as it developed around the time of the independence struggle. The order depicting East and West in rigid terms achieved its renaissance in the early 2000s
with the AKP's electoral victory, according to Nurdan Gürbilek. 26 The degree to which this was indeed the case from the beginning of the AKP's establishment (2001) and its period in government (from 2002) is the subject of controversy. For some, the very fact that the AKP was a product of a shift to the political centre and represented at least the partial abandonment of Erbakan's Milli Görüş discourse, presented an opportunity for bridging the gap between East and West, if not abolishing the categories themselves. 27 For numerous others, such as Gürbilek, the AKP did not really signify such progress. It is true that Ahmet Davutoğlu 28 , one the AKP's major ideologues who explicitly focused on the question of civilisation and its role in international relations, argued against Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' and for cooperation between them. However, even though the emphasis was on co-operation rather than conflict, the categories of 'East' and 'West' themselves were not challenged. In Davutoğlu's works, an essentialist understanding of these civilisations is in evidence. 29 The AKP government was a sponsor of the 'Alliance of Civilisations' project at the United Nations, which indicated that, for them, civilisation had a substantive presence in the international arena. 'unravelling of modern identity' as it had been constructed by Kemalism was praised by some as cultural pluralisation and castigated by others as a 'rural invasion' and a 'cultural degeneration' that took the particular form of the 'return of religion'. 35 We see this in the controversies surrounding Turkish music. For example, Martin Stokes, in his study of Arabesk music in 1980s Turkey, observes an 'explosion' of popular culture but questions its easy association with the East and the Turkish 'periphery'. Already from the 1960s, '"Arab", Turkish, popular classic, Turkish folk, and Western pop and rock were mixing in a hybrid popular music style later dubbed arabesk'. 36 Arabesk was seen as the reaction of a disenchanted 'periphery', culturally and economically excluded, against a powerful central reformist tradition; it was also linked to 'Islamic reaction' and the government of Turgut Özal. 37 However, Stokes disputes the representation of Arabesk as 'a timeless expression of an Eastern passivity and pessimism' and sees it, instead, as the result of the stresses and strains of modernisation. 38 He notes that religious authorities in fact condemned it because of its association with sex and drinking. 39 Arabesk continued to be described as gecekondu (shanty town) music of the people from the southeast 40 but it was not listened to in the gecekondus more than anywhere else, nor were its musicians primarily from the southeast of Turkey. 41 The centre-periphery concept 'of a transcendent state tradition and an authentic cultural level associated with civil society' has little use in the analysis of Istanbul musicians. 42 Stokes argues, more generally, that the history of music in Turkey from 1950 onwards subverts the 'conventional' understanding of a conflict between an authoritarian, secular centre and a liberal, Islamic periphery. 43 Turkish popular musical cosmopolitanism has usually looked West, from the operetta in the Ottoman era to Eurovision and hip-hop nowadays, but also looked East, to Arab musical practices. 44 Similar ambiguities can be observed in the areas of halk (folk) and sanat (art) music. Stokes argues that the creation of halk music was part of Kemalist attempts to displace 'popular' tastes in music, which were seen as reactionary and
Eastern, in favour of a reformed Turkish music. 45 He points out that 'anthropologists have criticised this duality in a variety of ways' by showing the local identification with the state; halk music, specifically, which was associated with Kemalist reforms and propagated by the official TRT agency and State Conservatories 'has been appropriated at a mass level in Turkish cities'. 46 Sanat music -different from Arabesk -emerged in the official airwaves and was seen by critics as evidence of the undermining of Atatürk's reforms. This, again, is a monolithic reading; Stokes mentions as an illustration his music teacher, an army officer, who was also deeply committed to Ottoman and Islamic music and culture. 47 The hold of the categories of East and West also appears to have gradually weakened in some strands of Turkish literature. Erdağ Göknar argues that the novel reveals a more complex story than a conventional reading of Turkish history in which modernisation was a 'top down' exercise would allow. 48 The narrative form of the novel appeared in Ottoman cities in the 1860s confronting forms of traditional narrative that had existed for centuries 49 ; it had spread by the late nineteenth century. With the first rumblings of cultural nationalism around the turn of the century, there were calls for Turkification which was taken to mean 'freedom from -in the widely used term -"linguistic capitulations" imposed by Persian and Arabic, whose vocabulary and some grammatical constructions were integral to Ottoman rhetoric and expression. In essence, the goal was to make the spoken idiom the basis for the written language.' Eventually, 'linguistic engineering' was undertaken, which was also symbolic of nationalisation and secularisation. 50 However, Göknar argues that literary modernity did not simply involve Westernisation but rather recast 'Eastern' and 'Western' cultures from new perspectives as being interrelated and interdependent. 51 With the rise of Anatolian socialist realism in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a move away from nationalist to socialist ideals which focused on the Anatolian peasant. Some Islamic themes were included. 52 In 1971-80 there was a further development as 'the individual' emerged out of collective consciousness, for example in feminist writings and prison memoirs;
women authors also increased in number and prominence. 53 Themes involving Islam and lived traditions appeared more frequently and the 'Islamic novel' grew. 54 From the 1950s to early 1980s the literary field was almost wholly dominated by socialist 'or at least progressive' authors, 55 which forced the right into a defensive role. 56 This changed after 1980. 'West' were understood. 63 The 1980s Islamic novel was the culmination of a challenge to the modernising worldviews which dominated Turkish literature since the 1950s. 64 The Islamist novelists of that decade, most of whom had a rural origin, had an instrumentalist approach to literature, as a means of developing an Islamic consciousness. 65 They saw Islamic and Western ways of life as incompatible. 66 This brand of Islamic literature started off with a critique of Western-centric modernisation and put forward an imagined 'ideal Islamic order' which derived 'absolute truth' from the period of the prophet and four caliphs; it employed a 'we versus them' discourse and sought to impose a 'unitary and singular Islamic worldview upon others'. 67 For Islamists, civilisation equalled Westernisation, which in turn equalled de-Islamisation 68 ; they therefore sought to reclaim 'civilisation' 69 , stating that they represented 'real' civilisation against the 'imitative' Western agents. 70 What we see in the 1990s, however, according to Çayır, is a set of new developments within the genre: specifically, the emergence of a self-critical, self-reflexive Islamic literature which re-evaluated those rigid categories, produced by a younger generation of Islamic authors born in the 1960s. 71 Although some Islamic groups still maintained a collectivist discourse, several other more self-critical ones took a publicly critical stance toward their old revolutionary interpretation of Islam. 72 This was reflected in a new generation of Islamic novels whose heroes and heroines began to question pre-existing binaries and categories. 73 They pointed to the privatisation of Islam 74 and carried anti-Islamist, as opposed to anti-Islamic messages. 75 A tension was developing between individual and collective Islamic subjects 76 , a tension which represented the new Islamism emerging in Turkey of the late 1990s, 77 more of which below.
Historiography and challenges to the 'civilisational' discourse
In his study of new trends in Turkish historiography, Leonidas Karakatsanis argues that the 'discursive dipoles' of 'Europe-Turkey', 'Islam-Christianity' and others emerged in the late
Ottoman period and were used to construct ideas about 'selfhood and otherhood'; from this he extrapolates that the changing ways in which events of that period are perceived in contemporary Turkey reveal that identities are currently evolving. 78 Karakatsanis shows that in the official Turkish Republican historiography from the 1920s-30s to the 1980s -mainly Kemalist but also leftist and Islamist or conservative -the dominant categories were of 'us'
versus 'them', with 'us' being described in either national or religious terms and 'them' being 'the West', depicted as 'the other'. 79 However, from the 1980s onwards, a new generation of historians who worked under the influence of a liberal approach to history, evinced a shift to a wider 'we'. They 'examined the nineteenth century and the Ottoman state from more nuanced perspectives'. 80 Their approach to civilian casualties showed changing conceptions of victimhood and an expansion of identity from 'us versus them' to 'the human'. 81 Nora Fisher
Onar also points to a wider reconsideration and re-contestation of the Ottoman past, and in particular Ottoman universalism, in a debate between schools of political thought in post-1980s
Turkey.
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Recent trends within Islamic historiography in Turkey also hint at a new universalism. İsmail Kara, a historian of Islamic thought in Turkey, outlines how, as new conceptions of history formed due the entry of the ideas of 'progress' and 'European civilization' into the Islamic world from the nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals were quick to interpret political and military defeats as cultural, social and institutional defeats for Islam. 83 They glorified the Islamic past and decried present decline and this led to a break with history and a fixation on an idealised golden era, the time of the prophet and the orthodox caliphs. From then on, history started to be seen as a burden, not a treasury, and even the Seljuk and Ottoman periods were ignored. The ideal period was also separated from its antecedents, earlier prophets and monotheistic religions. Previously, Islamic scholars used to see history as the history of humanity with Adam and Eve as its beginning. From then on, actual history was transformed and reconstructed on the basis of a golden age. 84 Hamid Dabashi launched on 'the very concept of civilization have helped debunk this obsolete construct'. 92 Yenigün's critique targets civilisation in both its universal and particular sense (Muslim civilisation). He refers to the discourse on Islamic civilisation as having 'essentializing tendencies and intrinsic false binaries'. 93 He asserts that 'Islamic civilization'
was 'a defensive discourse constructed by Muslim apologists to counteract the project of the "West", which constructed "the Orient" to serve as its distinct and inferior "other"'. He argues that 'a "post-Western", post-Orientalist overcoming of the categories of "Western", "Eastern", or "Islamic" civilizations is an urgent step that must be taken and that this step is now more feasible than ever thanks to the recent efforts of some Muslim thinkers'.
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Conclusion: the promise of Gezi
Turkish identity debates at the current juncture continue to be framed along the lines of 'East'
and 'West'. The idea of the split between 'Eastern' and 'Western' civilisations permeates both political and intellectual discourses and is constantly being reproduced and reinforced, not least for short-term, politically instrumentalist reasons. However, elements of musical and literary culture and new intellectual developments and trends in historiography provide areas where the East-West binary is being overcome and point to the possibility of a new universalism.
Evidence that this binary is being overcome can also be found in some parts of Turkish society.
Even a cursory glance at public opinion polls illustrates the complexity of issues of identity, when one moves beyond a superficial reading. Much has been written about the rise of conservatism and religiosity in Turkey 95 ; though others dispute this. 96 Even if we can assume, however, that Turkey is a very conservative and religious society, and becoming increasingly so, at the same time the percentage of Turks favouring EU accession has remained high, ranging over the past fifteen years from 40 to 75 per cent. 97 The reasons for this, naturally, have a lot to do with the expectation of economic advantage but it also shows that, for the majority of Turkish citizens, being Muslim and being European, hence Western, is not in contradiction.
As Çayır says, it is not the case that homogenous groups of Islamists clash with monolithic secular groups in Turkey. 98 Many of the Islamic intellectuals who are purveyors of the discourse on Islamic civilisation are themselves cut off from ordinary people, which belies their claim to 'authenticity'. 99 Notwithstanding the self-segregation of secular and religious Turks, for some Turkey is becoming 'a more normal' country in that, for example, politicians can be photographed with headscarved wives at functions. Overcoming the 'pro-Western selfloathing' of the past is celebrated 100 and Turks are 'negotiating new ways of living together'. 101 From an anthropological and sociological perspective, the idea that Turkey is split along EastWest lines makes no sense. and 'split urban space into hostile zones'; to the Gezi Protests which had a unifying effect on opposition forces over the defence of freedoms and rights. 103 Turam highlights 'the power of the urban space' which derived 'from its ability to stand above the identitarian or ideological fault lines in the defense of universal values of democratic liberties and rights.' 104 Street, neighbourhood and campus politics should be highlighted in comparison to more formal channels of politics. 105 She argues that Gezi demonstrated a 'new kind of inclusion and accommodation' and in particular new bonds and cooperation between the pious and secular residents; and that 'the axis of conflict was shifting from Islamism versus secularism toward the defence of a deeper democracy versus authoritarianism'. 106 Turam's ethnography traces 'spaces where the secular and the religious mix and tolerate each other', a phenomenon which is concerning to the AKP, much more than the existence of 'secular' spaces. 107 Gürbilek takes a similar line on the events of Gezi, arguing that they challenged the semiotic construction of Turkish identity as an uneasy fusion of East and West, where the two categories continue to be considered distinct and separate. 108 During the protests, pious citizens broke their Ramadan fasts on the streets and offered food to their irreligious fellow activists, deconstructing the Fatih-Harbiye (equivalent to East-West) dichotomy. 109 Political actors worked to re-impose the old symbolic scheme of opposition between the East and West to make sense of the uprising, with government spokesperson Hüseyin Çelik suggesting that the protests merely amounted to 'Nişantaşı's reaction' (Nişantaşı being an affluent Istanbul neighbourhood). Then-Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement that the largest square in Istanbul, and hence the one most appropriate for political gatherings is, in fact, the Kazlıçeşme Square, recently created in Yenikapı by filling in parts of the Sea of Marmara, was an attempt to present
Taksim and those present there as belonging to 'Harbiye'. 110 The square and the AKP supporters who attended his rally were implicitly associated with 'Fatih', affirming once again the binary opposition. 111 Gürbilek argues that the Eastern identity that the government was able to call to its assistance in the course of the Gezi protests was, in fact, rooted in the East-West dichotomy that had previously been constructed. However, the best way of preventing the EastWest dichotomy from blurring our vision is to act as though it does not exist: this requires defending Gezi as a moment that surpassed the Fatih-Harbiye distinction. 112 In 1986, Emre Kongar argued that Turkey 'stands a good chance of producing a new cultural synthesis for our times'. 113 This hopeful message appears to have perished under the weight of long-standing polarisations, the present politicisation of identity exacerbated by authoritarianism and short-term political instrumentalism; particularly in the current moment of schism following the failed military coup attempt of July 2016, which appears to have extinguished the spirit of Gezi. However, there still remains some truth in it. Turkish society is in some ways ahead of its leaders. Cultural and social change appears to go against the essentialist civilisational discourse of East and West and holds an implicit promise of a new universalism and a new Turkey.
